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Résumé
Je montre qu'un onsommateur averse à la perte qui doit répartir son budget entre deux
biens préfère des alloations pour lesquelles la onsommation est égale au point de référene
pour au moins un des biens, ou des solutions en oin. L'intensité du phénomène dépend de
la ourbure de la fontion d'utilité. Ces résultats sont ohérents ave plusieurs faits stylisés
qui ne peuvent pas être expliqués par la théorie standard du onsommateur.
Mots-lés : Aversion pour la perte, théorie des perspetives.
Abstrat
I show that a loss averse onsumer who must share her budget between two goods prefer
alloations for whih onsumption equals referene point for at least one good. The phe-
nomenon intensity depends on the urvature of the utility urve. These results are onsistent
with several stylized fats whih annot be explained by the standard onsumer theory
JEL lassiation numbers: D03, D11, D12.
Keywords : Loss Aversion, Prospet Theory.
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1 Introdution
The standard onsumer theory is based on the notion of utility maximization, through the
searh for the highest possible onsumption, but in the reality, we set ourselves intermediary
goals, whih make deision-making and tradeos easier. These goals serve as referene points to
assess our progress. It is therefore important to assess how these goals inuene our behavior
; in partiular, it turns out that agents behavior is often quite dierent depending on whether
their onsumption is above or below a given target.
These dierenes an be explained by the Prospet Theory. Prospet Theory was initially de-
velopped for risky hoies (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), then one of its omponents, namely
loss aversion, was extended to ertain hoies (Tversky and Kahneman (1991)). But this ex-
tension was built mainly for labor supply (f. infra) or for disrete hoies (and more preisely
binary hoies, whih are the losest to the traditional framework of risky hoies), whereas the
theory of the onsumer behavior relies on ontinuous hoies under a budgetary onstraint.
Thus, Köszegi and Rabin (2006) deal with the issue of the referene point formation when
there exists an initial unertainty, whih disappears before the nal onsumption deision. From
this standpoint, their model is an intermediary step between risky and ertain hoie, not an
analysis of ertain hoie strito sensu ; in partiular, their model ontinues to fous on binary
hoies, between buying and not buying for a single good, or between two lump goods.
In the next setion, I study the optimal hoie of a onsumer who must share her budget
between two goods and who is loss averse. I suessively onsider three funtional forms for the
utility funtion :
 linear,
 onvex in losses and onave in gains,
 and nally onave everywhere.
In the third setion, I disuss several behaviors whih annot be explained in the standard
onsumer theory, but whih are onsistent with loss aversion
2 Models
Prospet Theory endows the onsumer with a utility funtion whih is slightly onave in
gains (when the onsumption is higher than the referene point), and slightly onvex in losses,
with a stronger slope in losses than in gains. In pratial appliations, a tratable and often
3
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used approximation is to onsider an utility funtion whih is pieewise linear, with a kink at
the referene point.
On the ontrary, standard onsumer theory relies on utility funtions whih are everywhere
onave, and whih have no referene point (i.e. utility is equal to zero for a null onsumption).
I will therefore proeed in three steps, and onsider the eet of loss aversion in three ases :
 First, in the simplest ase, namely a linear utility funtion ;
 Seond, when the utility funtion is S-shaped as in the Prospet Theory ;
 Finally, when the utility is standard, that is onave, but has a referene point.
2.1 Linear utility
I begin with the ase of a linear utility funtion with two goods, c1 and c2 :
U(c1, c2) = c1 + β ∗ c2
s.t. p1c1 + p2c2 = W
with β the relative weight of the good 2 in terms of the good 1 in the utility funtion.
Figure 1 shows the graph of the utility funtion and the orresponding indierene urves.
On a side note, for all gures in this artile, I took β = p1 = p2 = 1 without loss of generality.
Figure 1: Linear Utility
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The solution of the onsumer's utility maximization program is a orner solution if the slope
of the budget onstraint line is not equal to the slope of the indierene urves. If both slopes
are equal, the onsumer is indierent between all possible alloations on her budget onstraint.
Figure 2 shows an example of a possible budget line. The optimal solution is to alloate the
whole budget to good 2.
4
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Figure 2: Linear Utility  Budget Line
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I now introdue loss aversion for eah of the two goods. That is to say, for eah good, the
onsumer has a referene point, at whih utility is equal to zero.
The utility funtion is then
U(c1, c2) = u1(c1) + β ∗ u2(c2)
s.t. p1c1 + p2c2 = W
with β the relative weight of good 2 with respet to the good 1, λ the loss aversion oeient,
W the onsumer's budget, and
ui(ci) = ci − ri si ci ≥ ri
ui(ci) = −λ(ri − ci) si ci < ri
where ri is the referene point for good i, and ci is the onsumption of good i.
Figure 3 shows the utility funtion and the orresponding indierene urves, for a vetor of
referene points (20, 20).
As the utility funtion for eah good is stepwise linear, the indierene urves are also stepwise
linear, and the Marginal Rate of Substitution is a step funtion (i.e. stepwise onstant). We an
notie that MRS are equal in quadrants South-West and North-East, and they are the inverse
of eah other in quadrants South-East and North-West.
Therefore, there always exists orner solutions, when the relative prie is very low or very
high. Formally, we have a orner solution when
p2
p1
< β
λ
or
p2
p1
> βλ. But when the relative
prie is between these two boundaries, there exists a new type of solutions, whih we ould all
"interior orner solutions" : the indierene urves present kinks at the referene point for eah
5
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Figure 3: Linear Utility with Loss Aversion
(a)
0
10
20
30
40
50
0
10
20
30
40
50
−100
−80
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
c1
Fonction utilité
c2
(b)
Courbes indifférence
c1
c2
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
good, and thus it is optimal for the onsumer to set the onsumption of one of the two goods at
the orresponding referene point, and to adjust the onsumption of the other good aordingly.
Figure 4 shows an example of a lassial orner solution, and an example of the new solution
type.
Figure 4: Linear Utility with Loss Aversion  Optimal Solutions
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2.2 Prospet Theory
I will now onsider the ase when the onsumer has a Prospet Theory utility funtion :
U(c1, c2) = u1(c1) + β ∗ u2(c2)
s.t. p1c1 + p2c2 = W
6
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with β the relative weight of the good 2 in terms of the good 1, λ the loss aversion oeient,
W the onsumer's budget, and
ui(ci) = (ci − ri)
α
si ci ≥ ri
ui(ci) = −λ(ri − ci)
α
si ci < ri
Figure 5 shows the utility funtion and the orresponding indierene urves, for a vetor of
referene points (20, 20). I took α = 0.5 to make more salient the onvex and onave parts of
the utility funtion, even though the standard value in the literature is α = 0.88.
Figure 5: Utility Funtion of the Prospet Theory
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The solution of the onsumer's program is not obvious : the shape of the utility funtion
hanges aording to the position of the onsumption vetor (c1, c2) with respet to the referene
points vetor (r1, r2). In the general ase, there are four possible situations, orresponding to
the four "quadrants" dened by the referene points vetor :
 c1 ≥ r1 and c2 ≥ r2 ;
 c1 ≥ r1 and c2 ≤ r2 ;
 c1 ≤ r1 and c2 ≥ r2 ;
 c1 ≤ r1 and c2 ≤ r2 ;
As the shape of the utility funtion hanges from one quadrant to the next, instead of being
everywhere onave, we annot determine the optimal solution for the onsumer program diretly
through variational methods (rst and seond order onditions). For eah quadrant, we need
to alulate the loally optimal solutions, whether they are interior, orner, or "interior orner"
solutions ; then we will be able to determine the global optimum by omparing all the loal
optima that are atually inside the budget set.
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2.2.1 North East Quadrant : c1 ≥ r1 and c2 ≥ r2
Interior Solution In the NE quadrant of the onsumption spae, we have
U(c1, c2) = (c1 − r1)
α + β(c2 − r2)
α s.t. p1c1 + p2c2 = W
Or, if we remplae c2 by its expression in the budget onstraint
U(c1) = (c1 − r1)
α + β
(
W − p1c1
p2
− r2
)α
We take the rst derivative :
∂U
∂c1
(c1) = α(c1 − r1)
α−1 + αβ
(
−p1
p2
)(
W − p1c1
p2
− r2
)α−1
This derivative is equal to zero if
α(c∗1 − r1)
α−1 = αβ
(
p1
p2
)(
W−p1c
∗
1
p2
− r2
)α−1
c∗1 − r1 = β
1
α−1
(
p1
p2
) 1
α−1
(
W−p1c
∗
1
p2
− r2
)
c∗1 − r1 = β
1
α−1
(
p1
p2
) 1
α−1
(
W
p2
− r2
)
− β
1
α−1
(
p1
p2
) 1
α−1
(
p1
p2
)
c∗1
c∗1 + β
1
α−1
(
p1
p2
) 1
α−1
(
p1
p2
)
c∗1 = r1 + β
1
α−1
(
p1
p2
) 1
α−1
(
W
p2
− r2
)
[
1 + β
1
α−1
(
p1
p2
) α
α−1
]
c∗1 = r1 + β
1
α−1
(
p1
p2
) 1
α−1
(
W
p2
− r2
)
c∗1 =
[
1 + β
1
α−1
(
p1
p2
) α
α−1
]
−1
r1 +
β
1
α−1
(
p1
p2
) 1
α−1
1+β
1
α−1
(
p1
p2
) α
α−1
(
W
p2
− r2
)
We an notie that for β = p1 = p2 = 1 and r1 = r2 (the goods are perfetly symmetrial),
we have c∗1 = c
∗
2 =
W
2 , whih is onsistent with the intuition. If β = p1 = p2 = 1 but r1 6= r2, we
have
c∗1 =
1
2
(r1 − r2) +
W
2
, and thus c∗1 − r1 = c2 − r2 =
W
2
−
1
2
(r1 + r2)
That is to say, the onsumer has an equal "net onsumption" (onsumption minus referene
point) for eah good.
Let's take the seond order derivative :
∂2U
∂(c1)2
(c1) = α(α− 1)(c1 − r1)
α−2 + α(α− 1)β
(
−p1
p2
)2(W − p1c1
p2
− r2
)α−2
8
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The orresponding seond order ondition (after simplifying by α(α − 1) < 0) is
(c∗1 − r1)
α−2 + β
(
p1
p2
)2(W − p1c∗1
p2
− r2
)α−2
≥ 0
This ondition is fullled for c1 ≥ r1, c2 ≥ r2 and α ≤ 1.
This means we an exlude "frontier" solutions c1 = r1, c2 > r2 et c1 > r1, c2 = r2. Indeed,
if we onsider the rst possibility (c1 = r1, c2 > r2), we have
U(r1) = U (c
∗
1) + U
′ (c∗1) (r1 − c
∗
1) + U
′′ (c∗1) (r1 − c
∗
1)
2
= U (c∗1) + U
′′ (c∗1) (r1 − c
∗
1)
2 < U (c∗1)
by onavity of the utility funtion in this quadrant. Therefore, we annot have a frontier
solution between this quadrant and another one, as the interior solution gives a higher utility.
We an exlude the seond type of frontier solutions with a similar line of reasoning.
2.2.2 South-East Quadrant: c1 ≥ r1 and c2 < r2
Interior Solution In the SE quadrant, we have
U(c1, c2) = (c1 − r1)
α − βλ(r2 − c2)
α s.t. p1c1 + p2c2 = W
or, if we replae c2 by its expression in the budget onstraint :
U(c1) = (c1 − r1)
α − βλ
(
r2 −
W − p1c1
p2
)α
We take the rst derivative :
∂U
∂c1
(c1) = α(c1 − r1)
α−1 − αβλ
(
p1
p2
)(
r2 −
W − p1c1
p2
)α−1
The orresponding rst order ondition (after simplifying by α > 0) is
(c1 − r1)
α−1 = βλ
(
p1
p2
)(
r2 −
W − p1c1
p2
)α−1
that is (
r2 −
W−p1c1
p2
)1−α
= βλ
(
p1
p2
)
(c1 − r1)
1−α
r2 −
W−p1c1
p2
=
[
βλ
(
p1
p2
)] 1
1−α
(c1 − r1)
r2 +
[
βλ
(
p1
p2
)] 1
1−α
r1 −
W
p2
=
[
βλ
(
p1
p2
)] 1
1−α
c1 +
(
p1
p2
)
c1
9
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And eventually
c∗1 =
[(
p1
p2
)
+
(
βλ
(
p1
p2
)) 1
1−α
]−1 [
r2 +
(
βλ
(
p1
p2
)) 1
1−α
r1 −
W
p2
]
Let's take the seond order derivative and alulate the seond order ondition for this equation
to dene a loal maximum :
∂2U
∂(c1)2
(c1) = α(α − 1)(c1 − r1)
α−2 − α(α − 1)βλ
(
p1
p2
)2(
r2 −
W − p1c1
p2
)α−2
The SOC in c∗1 is
∂2U
∂(c1)2
(c∗1) ≤ 0, or if we simplify by α(α− 1) < 0,
(c1 − r1)
α−2 − βλ
(
p1
p2
)2(
r2 −
W − p1c1
p2
)α−2
≥ 0
We an replae (c∗1 − r1)
α−1
by its expression in the FOC :
(c∗1 − r1)
−1
[
βλ
(
p1
p2
)(
r2 −
W − p1c
∗
1
p2
)α−1]
− βλ
(
p1
p2
)2(
r2 −
W − p1c
∗
1
p2
)α−2
≥ 0
whih means we an greatly simplify the inequality :
(c∗1 − r1)
−1 −
(
p1
p2
)(
r2 −
W − p1c
∗
1
p2
)
−1
≥ 0
or
r2 −
W − p1c
∗
1
p2
≥
(
p1
p2
)
(c∗1 − r1)
And eventually (after multiplying by p2) :
p2r2 + p1r1 ≥W
This inequality is the SOC for the result of the FOC to be a loal maximum. If it is not
fullled, the loally optimal solution is a orner solution. This inequality has a straightforward
interpretation : for the optimal solution to imply c2 < r2, a neessary ondition is that the basket
(r1, r2) is not part of the budget set for pries p1 and p2, and wealth W .
Corner Solutions The only possible orner solution in this quadrant is c1 ≥ r1 and c2 = 0.
Let us alulate the rst order derivative of the utility funtion in c1 for c1 = W/p1, c2 = 0 :
∂U
∂c1
(
W
p1
)
= α
(
W
p1
− r1
)α−1
− αβλ
(
p1
p2
)
(r2)
α−1
A neessary ondition for a orner solution is that this derivative be positive :
∂U
∂c1
(
W
p1
)
≥ 0
10
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or
α
(
W
p1
− r1
)α−1
− αβλ
(
p1
p2
)
rα−12 ≥ 0
(
W
p1
− r1
)α−1
≥ βλ
(
p1
p2
)
rα−12
r1−α2 ≥ βλ
(
p1
p2
)(
W
p1
− r1
)1−α
r2 ≥
[
βλ
(
p1
p2
)] 1
1−α
(
W
p1
− r1
)
we an see that for β = p1 = p2 = 1, this result yields
(c1 − r1)
α−1 ≥ λrα−12
This onlusion has an interpretation in terms of the utility funtion urvature : in the standard
ase, utility is onave with respet to eah good, therefore the more we diminish the onsumption
of one good, the more the marginal utility orresponding to this good inreases, and the more
painful any additional derease in the onsumption of this good. But here, utility is onvex with
respet to the good 2. This means that the more we diminish the onsumption of this good, the
more the marginal utility of this good dereases. If we ross the threshold when marginal utility
for both goods is equal (e.g. when the referene point for good 2 is very high), the onsumer
would be better o suppressing all onsumption of good 2 and alloating all her budget to the
onsumption of good 1. Figure 6 illustrates this phenomenon.
Figure 6: Corner solution in the SE quadrant
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Frontier Solutions We don't need to onsider the frontier solution between the SE and NE
quadrants. Indeed, even if this frontier solution grants the onsumer a higher utility than the
interior solution of the SE quadrant, the interior solution of the NE quadrant dominates this
frontier solution, whih therefore annot be a global maximum.
The only remaining possible frontier solution is c1 = r1, c2 < r2. We an apply the same
line of reasoning as for the NE quadrant :
U(r1) = U (c
∗
1) + U
′ (c∗1) (r1 − c
∗
1) + U
′′ (c∗1) (r1 − c
∗
1)
2
= U (c∗1) + U
′′ (c∗1) (r1 − c
∗
1)
2 < U (c∗1)
if the previous SOC is fullled. In this ase, there annot be any frontier solution beause the
interior solution grants the onsumer a higher utility.
2.2.3 North-West quadrant: c1 < r1 et c2 ≥ r2
The treatment of the NW quadrant is similar to the treatment of the SE quadrant. The
utility funtion is
U(c1, c2) = −λ(r1 − c1)
α + β(c2 − r2)α s.t. p1c1 + p2c2 = W
Whih means that
U(c1) = −λ(r1 − c1)
α + β
(
W − p1c1
p2
− r2
)α
The rst derivative of the utility funtion is
∂U
∂c1
(c1) = λα(r1 − c1)
α−1 − α
(
p1
p2
)
β
(
W − p1c1
p2
− r2
)α−1
The orresponding FOC is
λ(r1 − c1)
α−1 =
(
p1
p2
)
β
(
W−p1c1
p2
− r2
)α−1
(
W−p1c1
p2
− r2
)1−α
=
(
p1
p2
)(
β
λ
)
(r1 − c1)
1−α
W − p1
p2
c1 − r2 =
(
p1
p2
∗ β
λ
) 1
1−α
(r1 − c1)
W − r2 −
(
p1
p2
∗ β
λ
) 1
1−α
r1 =
p1
p2
c1 −
(
p1
p2
∗ β
λ
) 1
1−α
c1
c∗1 =
[
p1
p2
−
(
p1
p2
∗ β
λ
) 1
1−α
]−1 [
W − r2 −
(
p1
p2
∗ β
λ
) 1
1−α
r1
]
12
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The seond derivative of the utility funtion is
∂2U
∂(c1)2
(c1) = −λα(α − 1)(r1 − c1)
α−2 + α(α − 1)
(
p1
p2
)2
β
(
W − p1c1
p2
− r2
)α−2
The orresponding SOC is
λ(r1 − c1)
α−2 −
(
p1
p2
)2
β
(
W − p1c1
p2
− r2
)α−2
≤ 0
Here again, we an replae λ(r1 − c1)
α−1
by its expresssion in the FOC when c1 = c
∗
1 :(
p1
p2
)
β
(
W − p1c
∗
1
p2
− r2
)α−1
(r1 − c
∗
1)
−1 −
(
p1
p2
)2
β
(
W − p1c
∗
1
p2
− r2
)α−2
≤ 0
Then we simplify :
(r1 − c
∗
1)
−1 −
(
p1
p2
)(
W−p1c
∗
1
p2
− r2
)
−1
≤ 0
W−p1c
∗
1
p2
− r2 ≤
(
p1
p2
)
(r1 − c
∗
1)
W − p1c
∗
1 − p2r2 ≤ p1(r1 − c
∗
1)
W ≤ p1r1 + p2r2
We nd the same SOC as for the SE quadrant, whih is logial as the 2 goods are symmetrial.
Corner Solutions The only possible orner solution is c1 = 0. Let us alulate the derivative
of the utility funtion w.r.t. c1 when c1 = 0, c2 = W/p2 :
∂U
∂c1
(0) = λαrα−11 − αβ
(
p1
p2
)(
W
p2
− r2
)α−1
The neessary ondition for a orner solution is that this derivative be negative :
∂U
∂c1
(0) ≤ 0
13
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or
λαrα−11 ≤ αβ
(
p1
p2
)(
W
p2
− r2
)α−1
rα−11 ≤
(
β
λ
× p1
p2
)(
W
p2
− r2
)α−1
(
W
p2
− r2
)1−α
≤
(
β
λ
× p1
p2
)
r1−α1
W
p2
− r2 ≤
(
β
λ
× p1
p2
) 1
1−α
r1
This ondition has the same interpretation in terms of the utility funtion urvature as the
ondition in the SE quadrant.
Frontiers Solutions The only frontier solution we need to onsider is c1 < r1, c2 = r2, beause
we have seen that the frontier solutions with the NE quadrant annot be global maxima.
We an apply the same line of reasoning as in the SE quadrant (with c∗1 being now the loal
maximum in the NO quadrant) :
U
(
W−p2r2
p1
)
= U(c∗1) + U
′(c∗1)
(
W−p2r2
p1
− c∗1
)
+ U ′′(c∗1)
(
W−p2r2
p1
− c∗1
)2
= U(c∗1) + U
′′(c∗1)
(
W−p2r2
p1
− c∗1
)2
≤ U(c∗1)
if the former SOC is fullled. In this ase, there annot be any frontier solution.
2.2.4 SO quadrant : c1 < r1 et c2 < r2
Interior Solution In the SO quadrant, we have
U(c1, c2) = −λ(r1 − c1)
α − βλ(r2 − c2)
α s.t. p1c1 + p2c2 = W
Then I replae c2 by its expression in the budgetary onstraint :
U(c1) = −λ(r1 − c1)
α − βλ
(
r2 −
W − p1c1
p2
)α
I take the derivative :
∂U
∂c1
(c1) = αλ(r1 − c1)
α−1 − αβλ
(
p1
p2
)(
r2 −
W − p1c1
p2
)α−1
14
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And then the seond derivative
∂2U
∂(c1)2
(c1) = −α(α − 1)λ(r1 − c1)
α−2 − α(α − 1)βλ
(
p1
p2
)2(
r2 −
W − p1c1
p2
)α−2
The assoiated SOC (after simplifying by −α(α − 1)λ > 0) is
(r1 − c1)
α−2 + β
(
p1
p2
)2(
r2 −
W − p1c1
p2
)α−2
≤ 0
This ondition is not veried for c1 ≤ r1 et c2 ≤ r2, whih implies that the optimal solution
annot be interior to the SE quadrant.
Corner Solution Both types of orner solution are possible : c1 = 0, c2 = W/p2 and c1 =
W/p1, c2 = 0. By onvexity of the utility funtion, these solutions give the onsumer a higher
utility than the interior solution. To determine the optimal solution, we only have to ompare
the two orner solutions : the optimal solution depends on the relative prie and β. Indeed, we
have :
U(0) = −βλ
(
r2 −
W
p2
)α
et U
(
W
p1
)
= −λ
(
r1 −
W
p1
)α
2.2.5 Global Optima
Graphial Analysis We an analyze graphially the onsumer's optimal behavior, by on-
sidering that she possesses two "utility pumps", one for eah good, and that she alloate her
budget by introduing 1-euro oins one by one in one of the two pumps. At the beginning, both
pumps are empty, and the onsumer must hoose to whih pump alloate her rst euro. If she
alloates it to pump 1, the generated utility will be approximately equal to u′1(0) = λα (r1)
α−1
,
and similarly for pump 2.
Let us assume that u′1(0) ≥ u
′
2(0) and that the onsumer alloate her rst euro to pump 1.
As the funtion u1 is onvex in losses, marginal utility is inreasing, so it is in the onsumer's
best interest to also alloate her seond euro to pump 1, and so on, as the onsumer "limbs" the
urve of the utility funtion. One the onsumer reahes the gain zone, marginal utility beomes
dereasing, but it is still high enough so that the onsumer ontinues to alloate her budget to
pump 1. When the onsumer reahes the point c¯1(r2) suh that
u′1 (c¯1(r2)) = u
′
2(0)
then the marginal utility of pump 2 beomes higher than the marginal utility of pump 1, and
by onvexity of the utility funtion with respet to the good 2, the onsumer will alloate a
15
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Figure 7: Representation of the utility pump 1

u
r1
c¯1(r2)
suession of euros to pump 2. She will start alloate euros to pump 1 again only when the
marginal utility for both pumps will be equal. From this point on, she will alloate her euros
alternatively to eah pump until she has exhausted her budget.
Figure 7 illustrates this reasoning.
Global Optima Based on the former graphial analysis, I will determine global maxima, by
examining the dierent possible situations, depending on the quadrants aross whih the budget
onstraint passes. Indeed, the budget onstraint an pass :
1. only aross the SO quadrant,
2. aross the SO and NO quadrants,
3. aross the SO and SE quadrants,
4. aross the SO, NO and SE quadrants,
5. aross the NE, NO and SE quadrants,
Figure 8 illustrates these dierent ases. Let us onsider them suessively.
SO quadrant If the budget onstraint passes only aross the SO quadrant, the optimal solution
is one of the two orner solutions, the one with the highest utility. If β = 1, p1 = p2 and r1 = r2,
16
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Figure 8: Possible budget onstraints
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the onsumer is indierent between both orner solutions. If β = 1, p1 = p2 but r1 6= r2, the
onsumer devotes all her budget to the good with the lowest referene point : by onvexity of
the utility funtion, it is the good with the highest marginal utility.
SO and NO quadrants If the budget onstraint passes aross the SO and NO quadrants, we
have three andidate solutions :
 the orner solution of the SO quadrant,
 the orner solution of the NO quadrant,
 the interior solution of the NO quadrant .
We an notie immediately that if the budget onstraint passes aross the SO and NO quadrants,
the point (r1, r2) is not part of the budget set, and therefore the SOC for the interior solution is
fullled.
The onsumer hooses the one of the two goods with the highest marginal utility per euro. If
it is the good 1, as the onsumer's budget is insuient to reah the onave zone of her utility
funtion, the onsumer will devote all her budget to good 1, whih orresponds to the orner
solution in the SO quadrant.
If it is the good 2, it is heap enough for the onsumer to reah the onave zone of her utility
funtion. If the onsumer's budget is insuient to reah the point c¯1(r2), she will alloate
all her budget to good 1, whih orresponds to the orner solution in the NO quadrant. If the
17
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onsumer's budget is suient, she will alloate some of her budget to good 2, whih orresponds
to the interior solution in the NO quadrant.
SO and SE quadrants When the budget onstraint passes aross the SO and SE quadrants,
the reasoning is exatly the same as in the previous ase, with good 1 and 2 inversed.
SO, NO and SE quadrants In this ase, we an immediately eliminate the interior extremum
of the SO quadrant, beause we have seen that it is a minimum and not a maximum. The hoie
between the NO and SE quadrants is based on the relative prie between the two goods and the
onsumer's preferene. One the onsumer has seleted her "favorite" quadrant (i.e. the good to
whih the onsumer will rst alloate her money), the hoie between the interior solution and
the orner solution is based on the same riterion as in the previous ases.
NE, NO and SE quadrants In this ase, the onsumer's behavior will depends on whether
her budget is suient to reah the point c¯1(r2) (if she alloates her budget rst to the good 1
; the reasoning is reversed if she hooses the good 2 rst). If it is insuient, the onsumer
alloates all her budget to good 1, and the optimal solution is the orner solution of the NO
quadrant. If it is suient, the onsumer will start alloating some of her budget to good 2,
whih orresponds to the interior solution of the NO quadrant. Beyond a ertain threshold, the
onsumer will reah her onave zone for the seond good, whih orresponds to the interior
solution of the NE quadrant.
Conlusion We an sum up the general behavior of the onsumer by plotting the inome
expansion path, i.e. the set of onsumption vetors hosen for all the possible levels of wealth,
for given relative pries. The gure 9 represents the inome expansion path when the onsumer
onsumes in priority the good 1.
In other words, the lassial result of the onsumer theory stating that onsumers have a
taste for variety and prefer splitting their onsumption rather homogeneously between goods
appears as a partiular ase, whih applies only when onsumers are rih enough to keep their
onsumption above their referene point for all goods.
2.3 Conave Utility
Finally, I onsider the ase of a utility funtion whih is everywhere onave, but with loss
aversion. This funtional form is the one observed empirially by Abdellaoui, Bleihrodt, and
18
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Figure 9: Inome Expansion Path
c2
c1
r2
r1
c¯1(r2)
c¯2(r1)
L`Haridon (2008) in risky hoies, even though most empirial results for hoies under risk
are rather heading in the diretion of a utility funtion whih is slightly onvex in losses (e.g.
Abdellaoui, Bleihrodt, and Parashiv (2007)). As far as I know, this possibility has not been
onsidered for hoies under ertainty in the behavioral eonomis literature, and loss aversion
has always been assoiated with a linear or S-shaped (rst onvex then onave) utility funtion.
The only artile whih disuss this possibility is Lapidus and Sigot (2000) in the History of
Eonomi Thought, in an analysis of the benthamian theory of pleasure and pain.
Therefore, I suggest the following funtional form, whih yields the desired shape while staying
lose to the spirit of the initial Prospet Theory.
U(c1, c2) = u1(c1) + β ∗ u2(c2)
s.t. p1c1 + p2c2 = W
with β the relative weight of good 2 with respet to good 1, λ the oeient for loss aversion,
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W the onsumer's budget, and
ui(ci) = λ ∗ c
α
i si ci < ri
ui(ci) = (λ− 1) ∗ r
α + cαi si ci ≥ ri
The gure 10 shows the utility funtion and the orresponding indierene urves, with a
vetor of referene points (20, 20).
Figure 10: Conave Utility and Loss Aversion
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Let us solve the onsumer's program. The utility funtion is not everywhere dierentiable:
for ci = ri, the utility funiton is left- and right-dierentiable, but the derivatives are not equal.
As a result, the optimal solution is haraterized by
u′1(c
∗
1)
βu′2(c
∗
2)
=
p1
p2
if the utility funtion is dierentiable in c∗1 and c
∗
2, but
u′1d(c
∗
1)
βu′2d(c
∗
2)
≤
p1
p2
≤
u′1g (c
∗
1)
βu′2g (c
∗
2)
otherwise.
As the utility funtion is everywhere onave, the onsumer's behavior beomes again roughly
"lassial": exept if the preferenes or relative pries are extreme, the optimal solutions are
interior solutions. However, there is still some "rigidity": as the slope of the indierene urves
is dierent on the left and on the right of a referene point, if the optimal solution implies that
the onsumption is equal to the referene point for one of the two goods, there exists an interval
for the relative prie suh that the onsumption of this good remains onstant at the level of the
referene point, and only the onsumption of the other good adjusts. This situation is illustrated
by the gure 11 (the right side of the gure is an enlargment of the left side).
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Figure 11: Loss Aversion-indued Rigidity
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2.4 Disussion
I onsidered the eets of loss aversion for dierent funtional forms. This eets are qualita-
tively homogeneous : loss aversion indues solutions where onsumption is equal to the referene
point for (at least) one of the goods. But these eets hange quantitatively depending on the
funtional form : for a onave utility funtion, there exists only a rigidity of the onsumption
in the neighbourhood of a referene point, but the optimal solutions are always interior solutions
and they are generally responsive to a relative prie variation. For a linear utility funtion, and
a fortiori for a onvex utility funtion (at least in losses), the only possible solutions are orner
solutions or solutions where onsumption equals the referene point.
We an reall that the shape of the utility funtion has two possible interpretations. From
the standpoint of the onsumer theory, onavity means a dereasing marginal utility ; from the
standpoint of the theory of hoie under unertainty, onavity means risk aversion. Therefore,
our urrent results suggest that loss aversion should not be onsidered in and by itself, but in
onjontion with an analysis of the ontext and of the onsumer's psyhologial harateristis,
in order to determine the appropriate funtional form of the utility funtion (at least temporarily
and loally).
The standard theory of the onsumer's behavior relies on onave utility funtions, whih
indues a preferene for mixing rather than for extreme alloations, but some empirial results
suggest that onsumers might atually demonstrate mixing aversion and a taste for extreme
alloations (e.g. Dhar and Simonson (1999)). In the next setion, I present several examples in
more detail.
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3 Appliations
3.1 Cabdrivers labor supply
In an often quoted artile, Camerer, Babok, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997) observe that
New-York abdrivers show a "wage"-elastiity of their labor supply whih is negative: they drive
less on good days (i.e. days when the demand for taxis is high, hene a driver spends more of his
time atually driving lients instead of looking for one, whih implies a higher inome per hour)
than on bad days
1
. This behavior annot be explained if drivers maximize a standard utility
funtion: it would be more eient to work more hours on good days and less on bad days. Even
if the inome eet is stronger than the substitution eet, as soon as the time horizont of the
drivers exeeds one day, it would be better to work more on good days and take muh more leisure
on bad days. This result has been onrmed by Fehr and Goette (2007) during a randomized
eld experiment, whih oers a more ontrolled environment than a natural experiment.
The interpretation that the authors oer is that, rst, the drivers's time horizont is a day,
and seond, they have a daily inome target that they try to reah, and they feel loss aversion
when they an't reah it. This interpretation is onsistent with my results, but is is inomplete,
as it doesn't take into aount the urvature of the utility funtion. And yet, I have showed that
the urvature of the utility funtion strongly aet the onsumers's behavior. Moreover, both
Camerer, Babok, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997) and Fehr and Goette (2007) onsider only
loss aversion with respet to the inome, and not eort (or reversely, leisure), whih restrain the
generality of their analysis.
Let us get bak to the models I introdued supra, and onsider that one good represents leisure
and the other one represents aggregate onsumption. We also assume, in line with Camerer,
Babok, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997), that the referene points orrespond to the agent's
average leisure and average onsumption in the long run. We observe that indeed, whatever
the shape of the utility funtion, a ounterlokwise rotation of the budget line around the
point Lmax (i.e. the agent's initial endowment of time) leads the agent to keep onstant her
onsumption and to derease only her leisure. But if the hourly labor inome derases strongly,
the agent's optimal behavior will depend on the urvature of the utility funtion in losses: if
the utility funtion is linear or onvex, the agent will try to keep her onsumption equal to the
referene point as long as possible, but if the hourly labor inome gets under a ertain threshold,
1. Farber (2005) reahes dierent results with the same data by using a dierent eonometri strategy
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her behavior will hange ompletely, and she will "jump" bak to the referene point for leisure,
by strongly derasing her onsumption. On the ontrary, for a onave utility funtion, when the
hourly labor inome gets lower, the agent will start to derease progressively her onsumption
while also dereasing her leisure.
Similarly, with a lokwise rotation of the budget line (i.e. the hourly labor inome gets
above average), the agents optimal behavior will depend on the urvature of the utility funtion.
If utility is linear, the agent will inrease her onsumption while keeping her leisure equal to
the referene point. If utility is onave (whether it is globally onave, or only onave in the
gains à la Prospet Theory), the agent will split her additional inome between onsumption
and leisure, and both will inrease.
As a onlusion, this partiular ase illustrates how muh the impat of loss aversion on the
onsumer's behavior depends on the urvature of the utility funtion.
3.2 The "What the Hell" Eet
People on a diet often set themselves numerial targets (e.g. a ertain number of alories
per day). Their situation an be understood as a tradeo between two goals: on the one hand
alori restrition (in order to lean out), and on the other hand the pleasure oming from eating
tasteful food and taming their hunger. If these people had utility funtions for these goals that
were onave, a modiation of the "relative prie" between the two goals or of the "budget
onstraint", suh as being fored unwillingly into the loss zone for one of the goals, would imply
only small hanges in behavior. Yet, as suggest Cohran and Tesser (1996), a minor hange in
the situation an lead to a major hange in behavior:
Gunilla found the beautiful formal she wanted for the prom, but she needed to lose
some weight. Her friend, fresh from a soial psyhology ourse, reommended that
she set a spei, daily alori goal. On the third day, after eating a serving of "lite"
spaghetti, Gunilla read the pakage and realized that she was slightly over her daily
goal. Her response was interesting: She said to herself "What the hell. Sine I'm
already over my goal it doesn't matter what I eat". And she proeeded to onsume
half of her mom's apple pie.
Cohran and Tesser (1996) all this phenomenon the "What the Hell Eet".
This eet is not restrained to food diets, but also applies to all situations when a preise
numerial goal annot be reahed. Another example is money budgetting and redit ard use:
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Soman and Cheema (2004) nd that onsumers who have exeeded their monthly budget are
more prone to superuous expenses ompared to onsumers who are still in the limits of their
budget. And Wilox, Blok, and Eisenstein (2011) nd that for onsumers with a higher degree
of self-ontrol (and hene onsumers who an refrain most of the time from using their redit
ard), having an outstanding redit on their ard leads them to use their ard more.
These dierent empirial results are onsistent with an utility funtion whih is linear, or
onvex in losses. Moreover, when a onsumer ends up just below a numerial goal with no
possibility to get bak into the gain zone for this dimension, she has a tendeny to go further
away from the goal by deepening her losses, whih suggests that in riskless hoie, the onvexity
of the utility funtion has a stronger eet than loss aversion. This behavior is the ounterpart
for riskless hoie of the lower risk-aversion in losses for risky hoie.
3.3 Convexity and Self-Control
The examples I presented in the previous setion ould also be interpreted in terms of self-
ontrol. An argument against this interpretation and in favour of my interpretation is that in
other situations where self-ontrol does not intervene, we observe similar behaviors. For example,
Dörner (1989) nds that when faing a omplex situation with multiple and ontraditory goals,
where it is not possible to reah all of them, deision-makers often hoose to onentrate on only
one goal, even if it means higher losses for the other goals.
4 Conlusion
In this artile, I showed that loss aversion has observable onsequenes whih depends on
the urvature of the utility funtion. These observable onsequenes are onsistent with several
empirial phenomena whih annot be explained by the standard theory of onsumer's behavior.
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